Cameroon: The corn of governmental and political discord
By Louis Marie Kakdeu
In a letter dated May 8, 2026 and marked “Very urgent”, the Minister of Commerce, Luc Magloire Mbarga Atangana, asked his Agriculture counterpart, Gabriel Mbairobe, to block any new authorization to import maize. The measure follows an interministerial meeting chaired on May 7, 2026 by the Prime Minister at his office. The minister requests not only that new authorizations not be issued, but also that the effects of licenses already granted be suspended, to prevent their holders from using them.
The exact figures: imports vs. local production
Officially, according to INS figures, corn imports have increased significantly in recent years: 81,233 tonnes for more than 11 billion FCFA in 2024, before a slight decline to 72,586 tonnes for 10.2 billion FCFA in 2025. Previously, Cameroon had imported more than 39,000 tonnes in 2023 for a bill of 7.9 billion FCFA, compared to only 12,000 tonnes in 2022 for 3.3 billion FCFA.
What about national production? According to the mid-term evaluation of the SND30, national production remains stuck at around 2.3 million tonnes, while the State was targeting 4 million from 2025. We observe that the structural gap between supply and demand is significant. Despite an average annual production of 2.2 million tonnes between 2017 and 2021, supply remains lower than demand estimated at more than 2.8 million tonnes from 2019. National production increases by 2.2% each year, while the population increases by 2.8%, which accentuates the deficit.
It should be noted the existence of the paradox of informal exports: Around 50,000 tonnes of corn leave Cameroonian territory each year for neighboring countries outside official circuits, revealing a disorganization of the internal marketAdded to this are post-harvest losses estimated at 11% of national production. This work of disorganizing the internal market is a responsibility not assumed by the Ministry of Commerce to date.
This correspondence is not a simple technical act. It reveals several deep political tensions:
a) An admission of failure of interministerial coordination. The Minader representative himself admitted that import permits had been issued because the administration did not have statistical information on local production. In other words, the Ministry of Agriculture issued import authorizations without knowing what local producers had harvested. This is a major institutional failure. It is the absence in Cameroon, as I often notice, of an agricultural stock exchange which has proven itself in the cocoa sector (real-time connection of supply and demand) and which indeed falls under the responsibilities of the Ministry of Commerce.
b) A political signal addressed to the rural world. With more than six million players in the corn sector and producers selling off their harvest at a loss, the government could no longer remain silent. The letter is also a response to growing social pressure from farmers who are expressing their disillusionment. Until now, young people had been told that the earth did not lie, but those who got started were disillusioned by the absence of the market. One thing is to produce and another is to sell. The market-oriented approach in marketing today requires that we sell even before producing. Unfortunately, the commercial aspect of the import-substitution policy in Cameroon does not work.
c) The tension between two antagonistic interests. On the one hand, rural producers who want to sell their corn. On the other, industrialists (breeders, brewers, flour millers) who prefer imported corn, because the imported ton traded in May 2026 between 131,000 and 155,000 FCFA, compared to 140,000 to 255,000 FCFA for the local product depending on the location and quality. Local corn is therefore often more expensive AND less uniform in quality, which explains the industrial preference for imported corn. Once again, this problem is commercial and relates to the lack of structuring of producers at the base. Local producers are not organized in a network and trained to the requirements of the industrial world, and therefore, to respect the specifications and technical routes of production, transport and delivery.
d) An issue of food sovereignty and the SND30. The Cabinet Council had to ask ministers to make decisions which are consistent with the import-substitution policy supported by the government and the ambitions of the SND30, and which aim to protect national production and build food sovereignty. But this cannot be done when there is a major problem of coordination of government action. In 2026, 13 ministerial departments deal with agricultural production in a compartmentalized manner. This can't work. I often note that even MINPOSTEL through CAMAGRO has its agricultural program: this is a sign of government cacophony.
Who benefits from importation?
The issue is politically sensitive. Several beneficiaries can be identified:
* Private importers: a few large companies that have access to import licenses and take advantage of the price differential. The consultation meeting on May 13, 2026 brought together the presidents and general managers of corn importing companies around the table. They are called the international Bayam sellam who are all members of GECAM. And here is my problem with Cameroonian employers in its current form where we have more importers than local creators of wealth.
* Agri-food manufacturers (vendors,brewers, flour mills) who reduce their production costs thanks to cheaper imported corn.
* Administrative rent networks around the issuance of import licenses (a suspicion that the letter itself fuels by demanding the suspension of licenses already granted, which is a commercial offense). In all the ministries where technical opinions (import licenses) are issued, the logic of commissions and retro-commissions is favored over the logic of national production.
* Argentina, which remains the main supplier of corn imported to Cameroon. Contrary to what popular imagination may think, this does not primarily benefit the West or China.
What should be done? Structural avenues
With an average yield of 1.8 tonnes per hectare in 2023, Cameroon remains very far from the world standards of 5.9 tonnes per hectare and African performances such as South Africa which reaches 6.4 tonnes per hectare. The first thing to do is to popularize the results of scientific research available in Cameroon. IRAD is ready. You just need political will.
In the short term, we must generalize the practice of agricultural exchanges at the level of production areas to connect supply and demand, and only authorize the import of deficit quantities. An outright suspension decision is arbitrary and counterproductive. Everything must be measured to avoid destabilizing the local industrial fabric and increasing the risk of accelerating food insecurity among already hungry populations.
In the medium term, we must invest massively in reducing post-harvest losses (11% of production lost each year and up to 43% on other crops), in storage infrastructure and logistics towards urban markets.
In the long term: Build a reliable agricultural information system in real time so that the State knows, before issuing import permits, what the farmers harvested and stored — which would have avoided the current crisis.
In summary, the current ministerial crisis reveals the situation of a State which does not have sufficient data to manage its public policies. The real question is not “to import or not to import”, but “how to make local production competitive, abundant and well marketed”.
Louis-Marie KAKDEU, MPA, PhD & HDR
Second ViceSDF National President
